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#2A - 11/13/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 342, LONG ISLAND PUBLIC SERVICE 




CASE NO. C-3486 
-and-
SUFFOLK COUNTY VANDERBILT MUSEUM, 
Employer. 
GOLDSTEIN & RUBINTON, P.C. (RONALD L. GOLDSTEIN of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (RICHARD G. KASS of counsel), 
for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Local 342, Long 
Island Public Service Employees, United Marine Division, 
International Longshoremen's Association, AFL-CIO (Local 342) to 
a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). The Director dismissed Local 342's 
petition, which seeks to represent the security guards working at 
the Suffolk County Vanderbilt Museum (Museum), on a finding, made 
after hearing, that the Museum is the guards' sole employer and 
that it is not a public employer within the meaning of §201.6 of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Ai 
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The Director's decision was made within the following 
context. The Museum was established under the will of the late 
William K. Vanderbilt. His will provided for the conveyance of 
certain of his real and personal property to either the State, 
the County of Suffolk (County) or the Town of Huntington to be 
used solely and in perpetuity as a public park and museum and for 
an initial maintenance fund of $2,000,000. The County accepted 
the bequest from the trustees of the Vanderbilt estate in 194 8 
and later resolved that its Park Commission accept the real and 
personal property under the trust provisions of the will. 
Pursuant to that same resolution, the Park Commission was 
directed to apply for a charter as an educational corporation 
from the Regents of the University of New York, which was granted 
in July 1949. 
The legal relationship between the Museum and the County is 
described generally in a series of agreements, local laws and a 
December 1979 judgment of settlement arising under a lawsuit 
instituted by the Museum's Board of Trustees against the County. 
In relevant summary, the County is the owner of all Museum 
property, including the principal and interest of the trust 
funds, but the Museum's Board of Trustees has exclusive power and 
control over the development, maintenance and operation of the 
Museum, including all personnel transactions and the expenditure 
of the trust funds. All income from the trust fund or the 
Museum's activities must be appropriated by the County 
Legislature to the Museum's Board of Trustees. 
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In addition to the Museum's Board of Trustees, there is also 
a Suffolk County Vanderbilt Museum Commission (Museum Commission) 
which devolved from the former Park Commission. In June 1966, 
the County Board of Supervisors separated the administration of 
the Museum from the County's other parks and created the Museum 
Commission. The County Legislature is the successor to the Board 
of Supervisors and it appoints the members of the Museum 
Commission. In operation, the Museum Commission appears to serve 
as a liaison between the County Legislature and the Museum's 
Board of Trustees. The Museum Commission is also, however, the 
device through which members of the Museum's Board of Trustees 
are appointed. The members of the Museum Commission themselves 
constitute the Museum's Board of Trustees. The trustees serve 
staggered four-year terms, may not hold public office or 
appointment and are not subject to removal by the County.^/ 
Through its exceptions, Local 342 argues to us, as it did to 
the Director, that we have jurisdiction over this petition on any 
of the following alternative theories: 
1. The Museum is the sole public employer; 
2. The County is the sole public employer; 
3. The Museum and the County are the joint public 
employer. 
-i/The Board of Regents or the Board of Trustees may remove a 
trustee for specified cause pursuant to Education Law §§22 6.4 and 
226.8. 
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Having reviewed the record and the parties * arguments, we 
conclude that additional information is necessary before we can 
address Local 342's jurisdictional theories. On remand, the 
Administrative Law Judge assigned by the Director is instructed 
to obtain the following: 
1. A copy of the will of the late William K. Vanderbilt 
and any trust instruments; 
2. Information clarifying the precise nature of the 
County's ownership of the several types of Museum 
property; 
3. Information clarifying the exact role and function of 
the Museum Commission and the Museum's Board of 
Trustees regarding the Museum's operations, including 
the legal and working relationship between the two; 
4. A representative sample of minutes of meetings held by 
the Museum Commission and the Museum's Board of 
Trustees; 
5. Information as to whether the Museum is a tax-exempt 
entity under §501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
In addition to the above, the Director may consider any 
other information or documents which may be relevant to the 
disposition of the jurisdictional questions before us. 
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The case is, therefore, remanded to the Director for the 
acquisition of the additional documents and information and for 
such subsequent decision by the Director as is then appropriate. 
DATED: November 13, 1991 
Albany, New York 
m4v^ t->Kv<wy 
?la. Pauline R. Kinsel , Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe£ ~ 
#2B - 11/13/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-10944 
CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent. 
WYSSLING, SCHWAN & MONTGOMERY (W. JAMES SCHWAN of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
SAMUEL F. HOUSTON, CORPORATION COUNSEL (DAVID F. MIX, 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Buffalo 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ dismissed the PBA's 
charge against the City of Buffalo (City) which alleges that the 
City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally transferred work 
exclusive to PBA's unit to nonunit report technicians. 
In cross-exceptions, the City objects only to the ALJ's 
ruling which denied it an opportunity to call any witnesses at 
the last day of hearing other than the one whose illness on the 
preceding hearing date necessitated an adjournment. 
The ALJ held that precinct desk duty was not work exclusive 
to the PBA's unit because report technicians had been assigned 
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that duty at several of the City's precinct houses for years, at 
times working the desk alone. 
In urging us to reverse the ALJ's decision, the PBA first 
argues that no nonunit personnel have ever done desk duty in 
eight of the City's fourteen precincts. The PBA submits that 
each precinct represents a discernible boundary-^ to the unit 
work and, therefore, that it has maintained exclusivity over desk 
duty at these eight precinct houses. 
Assuming that the record can be read to establish that no 
nonunit personnel have been assigned to desk duty in eight of the 
City's precincts until the May 1989 order in issue, we do not 
agree that there is a discernible boundary to unit work which can 
be drawn along precinct lines. Although geographic location can 
be a component part of the definition of unit work, in the cases 
in which we recognized this as a relevant factor,-^ there was a 
relationship between the work location and the duties of the job 
as performed at those locations. There is no evidence in this 
record to even suggest that desk duty varies by precinct in any 
substantial and material respect.-3-/ We hold, therefore, that 
in this case desk duty is the unit work to which the exclusivity 
inquiry attaches. 
-i/see generally Town of West Seneca, 19 PERB 53028 (1986) . 
^See, e.g., City of Rochester, 21 PERB f3040 (1988), 
conf'd, 155 A.D.2d 1003, 22 PERB [^7035 (4th Dep't 1989); Hudson 
City School Dist., 24 PERB H3039 (October 8, 1991) . 
^See County of Nassau, 21 PERB f3038 (1988). 
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This brings us to PBA's second contention, that the desk 
duty assignments on and after May 1989 are different from those 
given to the nonunit employees prior to that date because the 
report technicians had rarely worked the desk alone before. 
In response to this contention, it must first be noted that 
the precinct report technicians do not always work desk duty 
alone pursuant to the May 1989 order. To the contrary, it 
appears that they are often paired at the desk with a sworn 
officer, particularly in the busier precinct houses. When 
working with a sworn officer, there is no breach of the PBA's 
exclusivity in the City's assignment of a report technician to 
precinct desk duty because that is a usage consistent with the 
City's practice before 1989. 
We also find no violation in the assignment of a report 
technician to unsupervised precinct desk duty. The record is 
unclear regarding the exact frequency with which report 
technicians were assigned to unsupervised desk duty before and 
after the May 1989 order, although it appears the City thereafter 
increased the rate of utilization of report technicians for 
unsupervised desk duty. We find the rate of utilization 
immaterial-4-/ to the exclusivity inquiry in this case because, 
as with the several precinct houses, we once again do not see any 
^See also New York City Transit Auth., 20 PERB f3025 
(1987). In that case, we held that a union does not reestablish 
exclusivity over unit work previously performed on a limited 
basis by nonunit employees even if the employer increases the 
rate of utilization of the nonunit personnel. 
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evidence that the job duties of the report technicians varied 
according to whether they worked the desk alone or with a sworn 
officer. Without a change in job duties, whether a report 
technician works the desk alone or with a sworn officer, 
implicates only managerial decisions involving an assessment of 
necessary job qualifications and a determination of particular 
supervisory needs, neither of which triggers a bargaining 
obligation. 
For the reasons set forth above, the PBA's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. Therefore, we do not 
reach the City's exception. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 13, 1991 
Albany, New York 
#2C 11/13/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UTICA PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 32, IAFF, and 
ERNEST DURSE, 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11701 
CITY OF UTICA, 
Respondent. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of 
counsel), for Charging Parties 
ALBERT A. ALTERI, CORPORATION COUNSEL (ARMOND J. 
FESTINE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Utica 
Professional Firefighters Association, Local 32, IAFF 
(Association) and Ernest Durse to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALT). The ALT dismissed the Association's charge, 
filed with and on behalf of Durse, which alleges that the City of 
Utica (City) violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it transferred Durse in 
February 1990 from platoon 4 to platoon 2 within the same engine 
company. The ALT dismissed the charge because he found that the 
Association had not proved that Durse was transferred in 
retaliation for his successful pursuit during 1988 of a different 
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improper practice charge against the City, which also involved an 
involuntary change of Durse's work assignment.-^/ 
The Association argues under its exceptions that the ALJ's 
decision was based upon an "inaccurate and omissive application 
of the facts" which, the Association contends, establish a prima 
facie violation of the Act, a violation unrebutted by the City's 
allegedly pretextual defense that Durse was transferred because 
he was the least senior employee on the platoon from which he was 
transferred. 
The City argues in response that the AKT's decision should 
be affirmed because it turned on the ALJ's assessment of the 
weight, sufficiency and credibility of the evidence. The City 
also emphasizes that Durse's transfer did not adversely affect 
his terms and conditions of employment. 
As all parties concede, the central issue in this case is 
whether Durse was transferred because he pursued the earlier 
improper practice charge against the City. If so, that Durse's 
platoon transfer did not negatively affect his terms and 
conditions of employment is not dispositive of the issue in the 
City's favor. The relative harm to the employee can be relevant 
to the ordinarily necessary inquiry into the employer's 
^/citv of Utica, 21 PERB f3066, aff'g 21 PERB J4580 (1988). 
In that case, we affirmed the Assistant Director's determination 
that the Association had satisfied its burden of proof in 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination which was not 
rebutted by the City. We held there that Durse was transferred 
to a new job assignment because he had filed and pursued a 
contract grievance. 
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motivation for the decision in issue. However, employment 
related action, which would not have been taken "but for" the 
exercise of a protected right violates the Act. In this case, 
moreover, Chief Robert Manfredo, who made the decision to 
transfer Durse, knew that the transfer would affect Durse's 
vacation group and that he would no longer be working regularly 
with the same employees, at least one of whom Manfredo knew to be 
Durse's good friend. Although Durse's wages and benefits were 
otherwise unaffected by his transfer, Manfredo knew from these 
and other circumstances that Durse did not want to be transferred 
and this alone made the transfer adverse to Durse's interests. 
As is often the case with interference and discrimination 
cases, the Association's proof of its allegations was largely 
circumstantial. Although its proof was sufficient to avoid a 
dismissal on motion by the City at the close of the Association's 
direct case, the ALJ concluded that the Association had not 
established a violation of the Act. Having carefully reviewed 
the record, we affirm the ALJ's decision. Although the record 
brings the City's motivation into question, we are not persuaded, 
as we were in the earlier charge involving Durse's assignment, 
that the Association satisfied its burden of proof. 
Part of the Association's proof consisted of statements made 
to Durse by the City's Deputy Fire Chiefs, Andre Espisito and 
John Dooley, some of which were made while Durse's earlier charge 
was still pending and another which was made after his platoon 
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transfer. In these respects, the ALT did not, as the Association 
suggests, conclude that these arguably threatening statements 
were not made or that Durse's recollection of them should not be 
credited.^J Rather, he found only that the statements could 
not be linked to Manfredo, who was solely responsible for the 
decision to transfer Durse. 
The Association would have us attribute the statements to 
Manfredo because the Deputy Chiefs are part of the City's 
management team with whom Manfredo consults frequently. From 
this consultation, however, we cannot conclude that Manfredo 
told his deputies to make the specific statements they made, that 
he ratified them, or that he otherwise condoned those statements 
in whole or in part. We concur with the ALT, therefore, that 
these statements cannot be attributed to Manfredo. 
In two other respects, the Association sought to implicate 
Manfredo directly in an alleged ongoing pattern of harassment 
directed against Durse. 
Durse was twice excluded from the distribution of monies 
collected by an organization independent of the City because his 
name was not on the distribution list, an omission allegedly 
caused by Manfredo. The ALT, however, credited Manfredo's 
•^/The statements are offered only as proof of the City's 
improper motivation for the transfer. The Association does not 
allege that the statements themselves violated the Act and, 
therefore, we have no occasion to consider that issue. Although 
the statements may have been actionable as improper threats, that 
does not mean that they necessarily establish or evidence an 
improper motive for the City's decision to transfer Durse. 
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testimony that he was not at all involved in the creation of the 
distribution list and the record affords us no basis on which to 
disturb this credibility finding. 
The second incident involved Manfredo•s statement in 
September 1990, several months after Durse had been transferred 
to platoon 2, that "AWOL" charges would be brought against Durse 
for his absence from work during the preceding summer. The ALJ 
found little probative value in this statement given its timing 
and that disciplinary charges were never brought against Durse. 
We can place no greater value upon it in assessing whether the 
earlier platoon transfer was improperly motivated. 
The Association also relies upon the several other ways 
Manfredo could have staffed platoon 2 other than to have 
transferred Durse from his preferred platoon. The ALJ did not 
discredit Manfredo's testimony that he wanted to equalize the 
platoon strength within engine company 4 and we are unable to do 
so on this record. Therefore, that there were a number of 
different ways by which Manfredo could have brought in personnel 
from outside engine company 4 to equalize the platoon staffing 
within that company becomes immaterial.-^/ Moreover, we cannot 
accept as a general proposition that an employer's chosen means 
•^As the Association noted during the hearing and in its 
exceptions and brief, Manfredo, for example, could have taken 
fire fighters who had earlier volunteered for transfer to engine 
company 4, he could have solicited other volunteers from outside 
that company or he could have involuntarily transferred fire 
fighters with less departmental seniority than Durse. 
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for the implementation of a managerial decision is necessarily 
retaliatory against any affected individual simply because the 
decision could have been implemented in other ways. 
This brings us to a consideration of the Association's main 
claim that Manfredo's application of platoon seniority was 
pretextual because, according to the Association, by contract and 
practice only departmental seniority is recognized for transfer 
purposes. On this basis, the Association argues that fire 
fighter Mancuso should have been transferred from platoon 4 to 
platoon 2 because he has less departmental seniority than Durse. 
Interference and discrimination allegations can be supported 
or established in appropriate circumstances by an employer's 
articulation of a reason for taking an action if that reason is 
subseguently found to be pretextual. In this case, proper 
application of this general principle would necessitate proof 
which would permit us to conclude both that involuntary transfers 
are controlled only by departmental seniority and that Manfredo 
knew or should have known that departmental seniority controlled 
and deliberately disregarded it in transferring Durse. As the 
ALJ noted, it is not enough to establish a violation of the Act 
that a court or an arbitrator might find Durse's transfer to have 
breached the contract. 
We have carefully examined the Association's allegations in 
this particular respect and, having reviewed the record, we find 
no basis on which to reverse the ALJ. The record reflects 
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Manfredo's belief that he is not required to use only 
departmental seniority when making an involuntary transfer and 
nothing in the contract or the City's practice is inconsistent 
with that belief. Although the record may not prove that 
Manfredo had used in-house seniority on other involuntary 
transfers, neither does it prove that departmental seniority was 
used exclusively for that purpose. That the contract does not 
refer to in-house or platoon seniority and that there are no 
records tracking that type of seniority does not mean that in-
house seniority either cannot or had not been applied to the 
involuntary transfers of personnel in the past. 
Our conclusion that the ALJ's decision must be affirmed is 
all the more compelled by recognition of the fact that Manfredo 
requested volunteers from platoon 4 for transfer to platoon 2 
before he picked Durse for involuntary transfer. Nothing in this 
record suggests that Manfredo would not have transferred any 
volunteer from platoon 4. Nor does the record show that Manfredo 
knew when he asked for volunteers that nobody from platoon 4 
would volunteer for transfer and made the offer with that 
knowledge to provide himself with a defense if Durse should later 
protest his transfer. 
For the reasons set forth above, and those in the ALJ's 
decision which are consistent with our decision, we deny the 
Association's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's decision. 
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THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 13, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/d". Schmertz, Member 
#2D - 11/13/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BROOKFIELD TEACHERS1 ASSOCIATION, 
NEA/NY, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-12003 
BROOKFIELD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
MADISON CENTRAL SCHOOL TEACHERS' 
ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-12004 
MADISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
MORRISVILLE-EATON FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
NEA/NY, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-12005 
MORRISVILLE-EATON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
Board - U-12003, U-12004, U-12005, U-12006, -2 
U-12007, U-12221, U-12224, U-12260 
In the Matter of 
MORRISVILLE-EATON SUPPORT PERSONNEL 
ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-12006 
MORRISVILLE-EATON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
STOCKBRIDGE VALLEY TEACHERS1 
ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-12007 
STOCKBRIDGE VALLEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
MADISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
TEACHERS1 ASSOCIATION, NYSUT/AFT, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-12221 
MADISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
Board - U-12003, U-12004, U-12005, U-12006, -3 
U-12007, U-12221, U-12224, U-12260 
In the Matter of 
MADISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
NON-INSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT/AFT, #4512, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-12224 
MADISON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
MADISON-ONEIDA BOCES TEACHERS1 ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-12260 
MADISON-ONEIDA BOCES, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT CLEARFIELD, ESQ. (JANET AXELROD of counsel), for Charging 
Parties in U-12003, U-12005, U-12006 & U-12007 
HELEN W. BEALE, for Charging Parties in U-12004, U-12221 & U-12224 
DANIEL J. MAHONEY, for Charging Party in U-12260 
SCOLARO, SCHULMAN, COHEN, LAWLER & BURSTEIN, P.C. (BENJAMIN J. 
FERRARA of counsel), for Respondents in U-12003 and U-12260 
HANCOCK & ESTABROOK (MARTHA L. BERRY of counsel), for Respondents 
in U-12004, U-12007, U-12221 & U-12224 
NODELL & JONES (STEVEN R. JONES of counsel), for Respondent in 
U-12005 & U-12006 
HARTER, SECREST & EMERY (JAMES P. BURNS, 3rd and SARAH LEWIS 
BELCHER of counsel), for the Madison-Oneida-Herkimer Consortium 
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BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This case comes to us on except ions-^/ to a ruling by the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) on a motion to intervene in the 
above-captioned improper practice charges filed by the Madison-
Oneida-Herkimer Consortium (Consortium). The Assistant Director 
denied the motion on the ground that the Consortium is not a public 
employer and, therefore, that it has no standing to intervene under 
§204.5 of our Rules which permits a motion to intervene only by 
"[o]ne or more public employees, an employee organization acting in 
their behalf, or a public employer . . . ." 
The Consortium is a municipal joint venture formed under 
Article 5-G of the General Municipal Law to provide and administer 
a self-funded health program for its joint venture members. Some 
of the joint venture members of the Consortium are the public 
employers which are the named party respondents to the improper 
practice charges. These public employers have allegedly 
implemented certain changes in the health program which the 
Consortium alleges were mandated by the joint venture. 
^These exceptions are before us pursuant to §204.7(h) of 
our Rules of Procedure which permits us to authorize exceptions 
to interlocutory rulings. We authorize these exceptions because 
the Consortium's status as a party to these proceedings should be 
decided before the improper practice charges are processed to 
completion. 
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In support of its motion, the Consortium argues that it is a 
public employer as defined in §201.7(vi)^/ of the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act (Act), that it, therefore, has 
standing to seek intervention, that it has a significant interest 
in the improper practice proceedings which will be prejudiced if 
intervention is denied and that the rights of the other parties 
will not be prejudiced by its intervention. The motion is opposed 
by the representatives for most of the charging parties, although 
not opposed by representatives of several of the respondents. 
Having reviewed the papers submitted in support of the 
Consortium's exceptions, and those in opposition to the motion, we 
hold that the Assistant Director properly denied the motion. In 
reaching our conclusion, we find it unnecessary to decide whether 
the Consortium is a public employer. Assuming that it is, we find 
that there is not sufficient reason to permit the Consortium to 
intervene. 
The interests of the Consortium and the named public employers 
under the improper practice charges are substantially similar, if 
not identical. The Consortium itself alleges that it and the named 
public employers espouse the same legal position. The Consortium 
will not be liable for a violation of the Act should a violation be 
found. That the Consortium's ability to do business may be 
affected if a violation of the Act is found is not a ground 
•^That subsection of the Act defines a public employer as 
"any other public corporation, agency or instrumentality or unit 
of government which exercises governmental powers under the laws 
of the state." 
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sufficient to warrant its intervention. If that ground were 
sufficient, a large number of persons or organizations such as 
private corporations in subcontracting cases or insurance carriers 
in cases such as these now before us would be entitled to intervene 
in our proceedings. We find that the purposes and policies of the 
Act are not fostered by such an open-ended opportunity for 
intervention. If, as the Consortium suggests, any of the charging 
parties argue that the Consortium is only the alter ego of the 
school districts, there is nothing to prevent the named respondents 
from calling witnesses from the Consortium or the members of the 
Consortium's Board of Directors to establish the Consortium's 
status as a separate legal entity to the extent that issue is 
material and relevant to a disposition of the improper practice 
charges. Thus, the Consortium's limited purpose for intervention 
can be readily satisfied by the named respondents. To add yet 
another party to a multiparty proceeding would unnecessarily 
complicate an already complex litigation. As the granting of a 
motion to intervene rests in our discretion, and finding 
insufficient cause favoring intervention, we deny the Consortium's 
motion. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Assistant Director's 
ruling denying the Consortium's motion to intervene is affirmed. 
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Consortium's motion 
to intervene be, and it hereby is, denied. 
DATED: November 13, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella/ Chad irperson 
Uu. L- -
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member^ 
Eric Jj/schmertz, Member 
#2E - 11/13/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
The Petition of PABLO LARA CASE NO. N-0004 
to Review Decision No. B-47-91 of the 
Board of Collective Bargaining of the City 
of New York 
PABLO LARA, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated October 23, 1991, the Board of Collective 
Bargaining (BCB) of the City of New York's Office of Collective 
Bargaining (OCB) issued a decision dismissing an improper 
practice petition filed by Pablo Lara (petitioner) against the 
City of New York (City). The petitioner alleged that the City 
violated his rights under the New York City Collective Bargaining 
Law (NYCCBL) by permitting supervisory employees to hold 
positions as officers in Social Service Employees Union, Local 
371, petitioner's bargaining agent. Affirming a decision by its 
Executive Secretary, the BCB held that nothing in the NYCCBL 
prohibited either mixed units of supervisory and nonsupervisory 
employees or supervisory employees in such units from being 
officers of the unions representing those units. 
The petitioner has filed a petition with us to review BCB's 
decision. 
Our jurisdiction to review an improper practice decision by 
BCB is granted by §205.5(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
BOARD - N-0004 -2 
Employment Act (Act) .-1/ As we have interpreted that section of 
the Act,-2-/ we may review BCB's decisions in improper practice 
cases only for substantive consistency with our own decisions. 
We do not assert jurisdiction over any alleged procedural 
improprieties by BCB as these matters are properly considered on 
judicial review of BCB's decision under Civil Practice Law and 
Rules Article 78. 
It is unclear whether the petitioner alleges to us that BCB 
should have considered certain additional facts in reaching its 
decision. If so, we do not assert jurisdiction because that 
allegation involves only an arguable procedural error by BCB. 
Alternatively, the petitioner does not specifically allege any 
substantive inconsistency between BCB's decision and our own 
^/Section 205.5(d) of the Act provides in relevant part 
that: 
[A] party aggrieved by a final order issued 
by the board of collective bargaining in an 
improper practice proceeding may, within ten 
days after service of the final order, 
petition the board for review thereof. 
Within twenty days thereafter, the Board, in 
its discretion, may assert jurisdiction to 
review such final order .... If the board 
shall choose to review, it may affirm, or 
reverse in whole or in part, or modify the 
final order, or remand the matter for further 
proceedings, or make such other order as it 
may deem appropriate, provided, however, that 
findings by the board of collective 
bargaining regarding evidentiary matters and 
issues of credibility regarding testimony of 
witnesses shall be final and not subject to 
board review. 
•^In re Petition of Organization of Staff Analysts, 17 PERB 
53114 (1984) and 18 PERB J3067 (1985). 
BOARD - N-0004 -3 
decisions and, having reviewed BCB's decision and the arguments 
set forth in petitioner's petition to us, we find no substantive 
inconsistency. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition herein be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 13, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kmsella, C hairperson 
#3A - 11/13/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GENESEE COMMUNITY COLLEGE EDUCATIONAL 
SUPPORT PERSONNEL ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3542 




GENESEE COLLEGE EMPLOYEE'S UNIT, LOCAL 819, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, APL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Genesee Community College 
Educational Support Personnel Association, NEA/NY has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
Certification - C-3542 - 2 -




All full and part-time regular employees of the 
County of Genesee and Genesee Community College 
in the following titles: Automotive Mechanic, 
Building Maintenance Mechanic, Campus 
Environmental Safety Officer, Campus Security 
Officer, Cleaner, Clerk-Typist, Computer 
Operator, Computer Repair Technician, Custodial 
Worker, Financial Records Control Clerk, 
Groundskeeper, Principal Clerk, EOC Courier, 
Receptionist, Reproduction Services Operator, 
Records Clerk, Secretary, Senior Account Clerk, 
Senior Campus Security officer, Senior Clerk, 
Senior Custodial Worker, Senior Groundskeeper, 
Senior Information Processing Specialist, 
Senior Reproduction Services Operator, Senior 
Stenographer, Stock Clerk, Audio Visual Aide, 
Senior Library Clerk, Building Maintenance 
Foreman, Library Clerk and Television 
Production Technician. 
All other employees of the Genesee Community 
College.-^/ 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Genesee Community College 
Educational Support Personnel Association, NEA/NY. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
•3=/ The unit description reflects changes, made with the 
concurrence of the parties, in the unit defined by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
[23 PERB 54068, at 4113 (1990)]. 
^ 
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agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 13, 1991 
Albany, New York 
mline R. Kinsella, Chi Paul hairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member ~jt 
#3B - 11/13/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CLINTON-ESSEX-WARREN-WASHINGTON BOCES 
UNITED TEACHERS, NYSUT, AFT, 
Petitioner, 





EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Clinton-Essex-Warren-
Washington BOCES United Teachers, NYSUT, AFT has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-3709 page 2 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time teachers, teaching 
assistants, registered nurses, social workers, 
school psychologists, guidance counselors, work 
study counselors, training specialists, 
coordinator-gifted and talented, coordinator-
school library system, occupational therapists, 
occupational therapist assistants, physical 
therapists, physical therapist assistants and 
interpreters for the deaf (sign language 
interpreters). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Clinton-Essex-Warren-
Washington BOCES United Teachers, NYSUT, AFT. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 13, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, ( 
/uMcz^ 
Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#3C - 11/13/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, APSCME APL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3858 
LARCHMONT PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: All part-time and full-time employees regularly 
employed in librarian, clerical and custodial 
positions. 
Excluded: The Director, summer and seasonal employees, 
and pages. 
Certification - C-3858 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: November 13, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
EricyO". Schmertz, Member (J 
#3D _ 11/13/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WARREN COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3848 
COUNTY OF WARREN, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of.Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Warren County Deputy 
Sheriff's Benevolent Association has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-3848 page 2 
Unit: Included: All employees in the Sheriff's Department of 
the County of Warren. 
Excluded: Sheriff, Undersheriff, Major, Patrol Officer -
Part-time, Special Patrol Officer, Patrol 
Officer - Seasonal, Court Attendants, 
Correction Officer - Part-time. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Warren County Deputy 
Sheriff's Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 13, 1991 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. 'Kinsella/Chairperson 
* W ^ <£****~^UL^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member /f 
